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Abstract:  According to Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s behavior or 
belief is inconsistent with another belief and one modifies one of the beliefs in an attempt to 
reduce the dissonance. In nonhuman animals, we have examined a version of human cognitive 
dissonance theory called justification of effort, according to which the value of reward 
following more difficult tasks increases, presumably to justify (to oneself or to others) 
performing the more difficult task. We have examined the justification of effort effect in 
animals and found a pattern similar to the one in humans but we propose a simpler underlying 
mechanism: contrast between the greater effort and the resulting reward that follows. The 
contrast model predicts that any relatively aversive event will result in a preference for a 
reward (or for the signal of a reward) that follows. Much evidence supports this model: Signals 
for reward are preferred if they are preceded by having to make a greater number of 
responses, encountering a longer delay, or experiencing the absence of food (when food is 
presented on other trials). Contrast has also been found when the signals are associated with 
greater rather than less food restriction. We have also found a shift toward the preference of 
a food location that requires greater effort to obtain. Analogous effects have been found in 
humans (both children and adults) using similar procedures.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive dissonance is a theory of human motivation according to which it is 
psychologically uncomfortable to hold contradictory cognitions. It has been used to describe 
the conflict that arises when one’s behavior is discrepant with one’s beliefs or when two 
beliefs are discrepant (Festinger, 1957). When dissonance occurs, humans often try to 
resolve it by changing either their behavior or one of their beliefs. For example, if I smoke 
cigarettes and I want to be healthy but I understand that smoking is unhealthy, my belief is 
inconsistent with my behavior and I feel dissonance. To resolve that dissonance, I can stop 
smoking; or, more likely, I can either ignore how unhealthy smoking is or I can try to convince 
myself that smoking is not really that unhealthy. Thus, cognitive dissonance has been 
proposed to account for certain behavior that is not easily accounted for by traditional 
theories of learning and reinforcement because according to reinforcement theory, given a 
choice between two alternatives, one should choose the one that gives greater satisfaction. 
Dissonance should not play a role. Although the resolution of cognitive dissonance may make 
us feel better, it can be detrimental to our health and can in many cases encourage us to 
behave inappropriately. The attempt to resolve cognitive dissonance may allow us to hold 
racist, sexist, speciesist or anti-immigrant beliefs that allow us to discriminate against those 
who are different from us. 
The fact that cognitive dissonance typically occurs because of a discrepancy between 
behavior and beliefs or between differing beliefs makes it inherently difficult to study in 
nonverbal species because it would be difficult to assess their beliefs. If animals do have 
beliefs, does it create dissonance if they are inconsistent? Or is the notion of dissonance a 
social phenomenon that arises because others value consistency in us and we want to avoid 
being referred to as hypocritical? If one could find evidence for a cognitive dissonance-like 
effect in other species, it might not only demonstrate its generality but it might also suggest 
that a conflict between beliefs is not the primary responsible mechanism. 
Justification of effort is a phenomenon subsumed under the larger umbrella of 
cognitive dissonance and is defined as the tendency to attribute greater value to an outcome 
that one has put greater effort into acquiring or achieving. In species that do not have 
language, justification of effort is more amenable to investigation than other examples of 
cognitive dissonance because relative value can be assessed by looking at choice. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the sentience of an animal when it makes a choice or 
demonstrates a preference, so one must speculate as to the feeling that an animal has when 
it shows a consistent pattern of choice similar to what we humans might call relief at task 
completion or task-induced frustration. In justification of effort, the cognitive dissonance is 
assumed to come about when evaluating the reward relative to the effort required to obtain 
it. If the effort would be difficult to avoid, the alternative would be to enhance the value of the 
reward, a more subjective judgment. For example, the child who comes home with a trophy 
after a season of playing soccer will express greater pride in the prize if it was awarded to the 
child who showed the greatest improvement in soccer skills (greater effort) than if it had 
been given to all members of the team for their simple participation (less effort). In the larger 
context of cognitive dissonance, one may alter the value of the outcome (one’s belief) to make 
it consistent with the behavior that preceded it (Festinger, 1957). 
Aronson and Mills (1959) studied the justification of effort experimentally by having 
participants read aloud as a requirement before listening to a group discussion. Participants 
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who had to read aloud embarrassing, sexually explicit material (severe test) judged the 
following group discussion as more interesting than those who read material that was not 
sexually explicit (mild test). Aronson and Mills explained their results in terms of cognitive 
dissonance. They proposed that to justify their behavior (reading embarrassing material 
aloud) subjects had to increase the value of the group discussion that followed. This finding 
has important implications for the effect of rites of passage and hazing rituals on group 
solidarity and loyalty.  
 
2. THE WITHIN-TRIAL CONTRAST EFFECT 
 
2.1 Animal Research 
 
2.1.1 Manipulated effort. Justification of effort can be studied in nonverbal species 
by providing an experience obtaining two similar rewards, one requiring greater effort to 
obtain than the other. Evidence for justification of effort would be obtained if that experience 
resulted in a preference for the reward that had required greater effort to obtain. To avoid 
potential problems with the changing value of one reward over another due to satiation or 
changes in food preference over time we made the actual reward the same on all trials and 
varied only the color of the stimulus (or conditioned reinforcer) that preceded reinforcement, 
depending on the response required to obtain the conditioned reinforcer. Thus, the paradigm 
used by Aronson and Mills (1959) can be adapted for use with animals by training pigeons 
on some trials to make many pecks for a conditioned reinforcer that predicts food and on 
other trials to make few pecks for a different conditioned reinforcer that predicts the same 
food, and then asking them which of the two conditioned reinforcers they prefer (Clement, 
Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000).  
In that research, all trials began with presentation of a white stimulus. On some trials, 
a single peck was required to turn it off and replace it with, for example, a red hue and a 
yellow hue, and five pecks to the red hue resulted in reinforcement (see Figure 1). On the 
remaining trials, 20 pecks to the white stimulus were required to turn it off and replace it 
with green and blue hues, and five pecks to the green hue resulted in reinforcement. After 
considerable training, we gave the pigeons a choice between the two stimuli that had been 
associated with reinforcement (the positive or S+ stimuli).  
 
 
Figure 1. Design of Clement et al. (2000) 
experiment in which on some trials one peck 
was followed by a choice between red and 
yellow hues (red was correct, yellow was 
incorrect), and on other trials 20 pecks were 
required and were followed by a choice 
between green and blue hues (green was 
correct, blue was incorrect). On test trials the 
pigeons were given a choice between the S+ 
stimuli from training. They showed a 
significant preference for the color that 
required 20 pecks to obtain in training 
(independent of the number of responses 
required on test trials). 
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According to traditional reinforcement theory (Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1938) the pigeons 
should have been indifferent to the difference between the hues because they both signaled 
the same reinforcement. However, if the contiguity between pecks to the white stimulus and 
presentation of the red and green hues played a role (e.g., Guthrie, 1935) or if the pigeons 
developed a backward association between the hues and the preceding response (e.g., Spetch, 
Wilkie, & Pinel, 1981), then one might expect the pigeons to prefer the red hue that was 
presented following less effort. Alternatively, if cognitive dissonance theory is correct and 
justification of effort was involved, the pigeons might prefer the green hue that required 20 
pecks to obtain over the red hue that required only one peck, in order to “justify” the 
additional effort that went into obtaining it. In fact, the pigeons showed a significant 
preference for the hue that had been preceded by 20 pecks during training (see also Kacelnik 
& Marsh, 2002, and for similar, more direct evidence with rats see Lydall, Gilmour, & Dwyer, 
2010). 
In this case, one might conclude that the pigeons experienced conflict between their 
beliefs (the law of least effort) and their behavior (they worked harder on some trials than 
on others to obtain the same reward), resulting in dissonance; then, to reduce the dissonance, 
they altered the subjective value of the reward. Alternatively, one can propose a more 
parsimonious account of the behavior: Whenever judgments of the value of a stimulus are 
affected not just by their absolute value but by other experienced events, there may be 
contrast between the initial event and the hue that followed, and the appearance of the green 
hue after the greater effort may have given the green hue greater value.  
Various kinds of contrast have been reported in the literature, including behavioral 
contrast, incentive contrast, and anticipatory contrast. Because the present contrast is 
somewhat different from the others, we call it within-trial contrast (Zentall & Singer, 2007) 
because it is assumed to occur within a trial between the effort and the reinforcement (or the 
stimulus that preceded reinforcement). A schematic of this contrast model appears in Figure 
2. According to this model, each trial begins with the relative value set at zero. The value of 
the trial decreases with the effort required and increases with the appearance of the stimulus 
that signals reinforcement. As the change in value represented by the appearance of that 
stimulus is greater following the greater effort, it should acquire greater value (see also 
Meindl, 2012).   
  
 
Figure 2. Schematic of the within-trial contrast 
model. FR1 = Fixed Ratio 1 (a single peck). FR20 = 
Fixed Ratio 20 (20 pecks). Rf = Reinforcement. 
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The strength of the model presented in Figure 2 is in the predictions that it makes. As 
the nature of the event that precedes the reinforcing event is specified only by its relatively 
negative value, the model predicts that any relatively negative event should increase the 
value of the reinforcement (or of the stimulus signaling the reinforcement) that follows.  
 
2.1.2 Manipulated delay. DiGian, Friedrich, and Zentall (2004) manipulated the 
delay between the initial link stimulus and the signal for reinforcement. Pigeons started each 
trial by pecking an initial stimulus that signaled whether it would be followed by a relatively 
long delay or not. If the initial stimulus signaled no delay, it was immediately followed by a 
simple simultaneous discrimination (e.g., red+, yellow-) and the choice of red was reinforced. 
If the initial stimulus signaled a delay, it was followed by a 6-s delay and then a different 
simple simultaneous discrimination (e.g., green+, blue-), and the choice of green was 
reinforced. On test trials a significant preference was found for the S+ stimulus that followed 
the 6-s delay. 
 
2.1.3 Manipulated absence of food. Another relatively negative event is the absence 
of food when on other trials food would be present. To test the prediction that the absence of 
food can serve as a relatively negative event, Friedrich, Clement, and Zentall (2005) signaled 
that a response to the initial stimulus would be followed by food and a simultaneous 
discrimination or by the absence of food and a different simultaneous discrimination. 
Consistent with the contrast model, on test trials, the pigeons showed a preference for the S+ 
stimulus that followed the absence of reinforcement.  
 
2.1.4 The location of food as the discriminated event. When considering the 
evolutionary basis for a phenomenon, it is often instructive to consider the adaptive value 
such behavior might have had in nature. One possibility is that when food is scarce, if food 
that is difficult to obtain (a relatively negative condition) has added value, it might encourage 
the animal to continue to search longer. What if food was difficult to obtain because the 
animal had to travel longer or work harder to obtain it? To test this hypothesis, Friedrich and 
Zentall (2004) trained pigeons to peck a yellow stimulus once on half of the trials to obtain 
food at one feeder and 30 times on the remaining trials to obtain food at a different feeder. 
Following this training, when the pigeons were given a choice between the two feeders, 
Friedrich and Zentall found a reliable shift in feeder preference in the direction of the 30-peck 
feeder. Once again, the relatively aversive event resulted in a shift in preference, in this case 
towards the location of the food reward. 
 
2.1.5 The state of the organism as the discriminated event. Further evidence of 
the generality of this contrast effect comes from research by Kacelnik and his collaborators 
(Aw, Holbrook, Burt de Perera, & Kacelnik, 2009; Aw, Vasconcelos, & Kacelnik, 2011; Marsh, 
Schuck-Paim, & Kacelnik, 2004; Pompilio & Kacelnik, 2005; Pompilio, Kacelnik, & Behmer, 
2006). Marsh et al. (2004), for example, extended the predictions of the contrast model by 
manipulating the degree of food deprivation of starlings. According to the contrast account, 
increased food deprivation should be associated with a relatively aversive state. Thus, one 
color was associated with food under conditions of mild food deprivation and a different 
color was associated with food under conditions of greater food deprivation. Marsh et al. 
found that the starlings preferred the color that predicted food when they were more food 
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deprived than when they were less food deprived, and they preferred that color whether they 
were more or less food deprived on test days. A very similar effect was reported in research 
with pigeons (Fox & Kyonka, 2014; Vasconcelos & Urcuioli, 2008), fish (Aw, Holbrook, de 
Perera, & Kacelnik, 2009), and even locusts (Pompilio, Kacelnik, & Behmer, 2006). 
 
2.2 Similar Results Found with Humans 
 
 If this contrast effect can serve as a model for justification-of-effort effects that have 
been found in humans, one should be able to find similar contrast effects in humans using 
these procedures. When Alessandri, Darcheville, and Zentall (2008) tested 7- to 8-year-old 
children using the Clement et al. (2000) procedure with computer mouse clicks in place of 
effort and shapes instead of colors as the discriminative stimuli, they found a similar 
preference for the shapes that followed the greater number of mouse clicks. Further support 
for the theory was reported by Klein, Bhatt, and Zentall (2005), who tested adults on a similar 
version of the task and found similar results. Furthermore, after the experiment the subjects 
generally reported that they were unaware of the relation between the effort required and 
the correct shape that followed. These results suggest that awareness of the relation between 
effort and reward is not needed to produce the contrast found. Finally, when Alessandri, 
Darcheville, Delevoye-Turrell, and Zentall (2008) attempted to control for the differences in 
duration between high and low effort trials (see Fantino & Abarca, 1985) by using differential 
pressure on a transducer as the differential effort manipulation, they found that S+ stimuli 
that followed greater effort were preferred over those that followed less effort.  
 
3.  CONTRAST RESULTING FROM A POTENTIALLY AVERSIVE EVENT 
 
To what extent might the effort itself, rather than contrast, account for the preferences found? 
For example, is it possible that relatively negative events result in arousal and arousal leads 
to better learning of the stimuli that follow? Clement and Zentall (2002) asked if one could 
obtain a preference for the discriminative stimuli that followed a signal that high effort might 
be — but was not actually — required on that trial. More specifically, on half the training 
trials, pigeons were initially presented with a vertical line which signaled on half the trials 
that low effort (single peck; FR1) would be required for reinforcement (see Figure 3). On the 
remaining vertical-line trials, pecking the vertical line replaced it with a simultaneous 
discrimination S+FR1/S–FR1 (the discrimination that on other trials produced reinforcement 
following a single peck) and the choice of the S+FR1 was reinforced. On the remaining training 
trials, pigeons were presented with a horizontal line that signaled on half of the trials that 
greater effort (30 pecks, FR30) would be required. On the remaining horizontal-line trials, 
pecking the horizontal line replaced it with a different simultaneous discrimination S+FR30/S–
FR30 and the choice of the S+FR30 was reinforced.  
On test trials, when the pigeons were given a choice between the S+FR1 and the S+FR30, 
they showed a significant preference for the S+FR30. Thus, the line orientation that was 
sometimes followed by a greater response requirement was sufficient to produce a 
preference for the S+ stimulus that followed it on other trials. These results extend the 
findings of the within-trial contrast research and show that the anticipation of a possible 
aversive event is sufficient to produce a within-trial contrast effect. Furthermore, differential 
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arousal produced by the actual effort just before the simultaneous discrimination is not 
required to produce the contrast effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Design of Clement and Zentall (2002) Experiment 1. Pigeons received the vertical line on half the trials 
and the horizontal line on the remaining trials. Pecking the vertical line resulted in an easy single peck to the 
white key for food (50% of the time for 50% reinforcement) or a bit harder 5 pecks to the green key on the 
remaining trials for food (50% of the time; pecks to blue were never reinforced). Pecking the horizontal line 
resulted in a more difficult 30 pecks to the white key for food (50% of the time for 50% reinforcement) or an 
easier 5 pecks to the red key on the remaining trials for food (50% of the time; pecks to yellow were never 
reinforced). On test trials when the pigeons were given a choice between the green and red stimuli, they 
preferred the red one, the stimulus that represented an outcome better than the white FR30 (30 pecks), whereas 
the green stimulus represented an outcome worse than the white FR1 (a single peck). S+FR1 = The positive 
(reinforced) stimulus that on other vertical line trials resulted in an FR1 pecking requirement. S-FR1 = The 
negative (nonreinforced) stimulus that on other vertical line trials resulted in an FR1 pecking requirement. 
S+FR30 = The positive (reinforced) stimulus that on other horizontal line trials resulted in an FR30 pecking 
requirement. S-FR30 = The negative (nonreinforced) stimulus that on other horizontal line trials resulted in an 
FR30 pecking requirement. FR5 = 5pecks. P(rf) = probability of reinforcement. 
 
4. OTHER FORMS OF DISSONANCE REDUCTION 
 
4.1  Out of Sight, Out of Mind 
 
Although the justification-of-effort phenomenon is particularly amenable to 
translation to a task that can be studied in non-human animals, it shows up as a bias rather 
than as dissonance that must be resolved. Many examples of cognitive dissonance arise from 
the choice between a small immediate outcome and a larger delayed or less probable 
outcome. Such a choice is made difficult because the value of the delayed or less probable 
reward is reduced relative to that of the immediate reward (i.e., delayed and less probable 
rewards are discounted). For example, cigarette smokers may value both the immediacy of 
smoking a cigarette and the delayed prospects of better health for not smoking. Considering 
these opposing alternatives is likely to produce dissonance, which can be reduced by 
rationalization. “Many people smoke and stay healthy.” That is, one can deny the negative 
consequences of the choice to smoke. Alternatively, one may choose to disregard the health 
consequences of smoking because deliberate ignorance allows one to avoid cognitive 
dissonance (Hertwig & Engel, 2016).  
Interestingly, because the value of the immediate and delayed options typically 
changes over time, instead of denying the long-term negative consequences of smoking, one 
 
 
 
 
   
OR 
FR1 
P(rf) = .50 P(rf) = .50 P(rf) = 0 
P= .50 P= .50 
White  Green   Blue 
 
   or 
P(rf) = .50 P(rf) = .50 P(rf) = 0 
P= .50 P= .50 
 White Red  Yellow 
FR5 FR5 FR30 FR5 FR5 
S+FR1 S+FR30 
or 
S-FR1 S+FR30 
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may try to find a way to compensate for the increasing value of the immediate reinforcement 
of smoking as the urge becomes greater. One way to accomplish this is by making a 
commitment to counter the attraction to the small immediate reward at a time when the 
immediate value of smoking is not so strong. For example, one may arrange to see a 
behavioral therapist (at some expense) who offers a device that provides shocks for smoking. 
Given that one could, in principle, decide to forgo cigarettes without such an intervention, 
one has instead chosen to spend money on a therapist who provides the opportunity to self-
administer aversive shocks. This solution would appear to be a complex cognitive decision 
difficult to explain with behavioral principles and unlikely to be demonstrated by non-human 
animals. Because animals are non-verbal, it would be difficult to assess their beliefs except 
by way of their behavior. 
Pigeons may nevertheless show behavior somewhat like that of the smoker motivated 
to stop smoking when the pigeons are faced with a difficult schedule of reinforcement. For 
example, differential reinforcement of low rates of responding (DRL schedule) reinforces 
responding but only if the response is preceded by a specified period without a response. 
Schwartz and Williams (1971) trained pigeons to wait at least 6 s before pecking a green light, 
after which the first response was reinforced. However, any peck before 6 s had elapsed 
terminated the trial. Under these conditions the pigeons performed poorly, receiving 
reinforcement on only about 4% of the trials. Schwartz and Williams then provided the 
pigeons with a nearby blue light (simultaneously with the green light) to which pecking had 
no consequence. Not only did the pigeons begin to peck the blue light but also pecking it 
allowed them to avoid pecking the green light; now the pigeons received over 70% of the 
possible reinforcements. How is this relevant to the complex decision-making presumed to 
occur when humans seek aversion therapy? In principle, the pigeon could choose to refrain 
from pecking the green stimulus but it soon learns that waiting is very difficult. One can think 
of pecking the blue light as a cost that removes the pigeons from the “temptation” to peck the 
green light, thereby facilitating successful learning on this task. 
 Alternatively, one could interpret the results of this pigeon experiment in terms of 
cognitive dissonance: there was a conflict between pecking early and waiting that caused 
dissonance on the assumption that the pigeon would have preferred getting fed on all trials. 
However, only when the pigeon was induced to refrain from pecking the green light by 
providing it with another light to peck was it able to obtain the majority of available 
reinforcements. Just as stopping smoking should not have required that the smoker pay a 
therapist to provide a shocking device, so too the DRL schedule did not require the pigeon to 
peck the blue light. However, the blue light allowed the pigeon to avoid the temptation of 
pecking the green light and thus to avoid the dissonance resulting from its negative 
consequences (in this case with the blue light, the green stimulus was “out of sight, out of 
mind”). 
 
4.2 Spreading of Alternatives and Public Choice 
Another form of cognitive dissonance involves the value added to an option once it 
has been adopted (or the reduction of value for options not adopted) especially when the 
decision is a difficult one (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). This phenomenon, called the 
spreading of alternatives, presumably occurs because after selection minor changes in the 
value of the options could lead to dissonance (an option not adopted might now seem better 
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or the option adopted might now seem worse). Giving the already chosen option greater 
value following choice would resolve the potential dissonance.  
A similar phenomenon, sometimes referred to as dissonance produced by public 
choice, occurs when people vote for one of two candidates, especially if it is a difficult choice 
(Beasley & Joslyn, 2001). To reduce the potential dissonance that may come from learning 
bad things about the chosen candidate or good things about the unchosen candidate, those 
who have voted in a recent presidential election show greater polarization in their ratings of 
the two candidates immediately after the election than immediately before (as compared to 
those who do not report having voted). That is, those who voted for a candidate tend to have 
a more favorable opinion of that candidate and a less favorable opinion of the other candidate 
than before the election.  
Egan, Santos, and Bloom (2007) tested for a reduction in preference for an unchosen 
alternative in a non-verbal species: capuchin monkeys. Subjects were given a choice between 
two equally preferred rewards. They were then given a choice between the unchosen 
alternative and an alternative that was originally just as attractive as both of the original 
alternatives. The monkeys preferred the novel alterative over the unchosen original 
alternative. That is, although the subjects should have been indifferent between the two 
alternatives, they apparently valued the initially unchosen alternative less.  
Although one could conclude from this experiment that monkeys too tend to reject the 
initially unchosen alternative in order to reduce the possibility of dissonance resulting from 
its initial rejection, Chen and Risen (2009) argue that in the case of the Egan, Santos, and 
Bloom (2007) experiment, the original determination of the indifference among the three 
alternatives was not likely to be correct. That determination was based on the nonsignificant 
difference in the latency to retrieve each of the three rewards. Yet not only is non-significance 
different from indifference but also latency of response may not always be consistent with 
choice (see Williams, 1992). Furthermore, Chen (2008) more specifically accounts for the 
spreading-of-alternatives effect by simply including the information provided by the initial 
choice in the later choice. That is, subjects weigh information to make their initial choice. 
When they make their later choice or evaluation, they include the fact of their initial choice 
which should make their later choice more polarized. To my knowledge there is no published 
animal research that has tested this. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE RESEARCH WITH ANIMALS 
 
 If the contrast hypothesis is correct, then it provides an alternative account of the 
justification-of-effort effect, which has been attributed to an attempt to resolve the 
dissonance from the conflict between beliefs and behavior or between two different beliefs. 
Contrast suggests that the basis for the justification-of-effort effect may be simpler. Whether 
contrast can account for all human cases of cognitive dissonance is not clear but it may be the 
underlying basis for this cognitive dissonance effect. It is also important to ask whether to 
experience cognitive dissonance is it necessary for one to have conflicting beliefs or even 
beliefs at all? If so, is it necessary to experience dissonance or tension as a result of that 
conflict? And if so, is the resulting behavior an attempt to resolve that tension? The research 
presented here suggests that there may be an alternative account, not only for pigeons but 
also for humans, because the preference for the outcome that follows the relatively negative 
initial event occurs under conditions that would not appear to require justification for one’s 
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preference (Alessandri, Darcheville, Delevoye-Turrell, & Zentall, 2008; Alessandri, 
Darcheville, & Zentall, 2008; Klein, Bhatt, & Zentall, 2005).  
It should be noted that the contrast account of justification of effort does not deny the 
role of emotion or sentience (felt state) on the part of the animal; in fact, several investigators 
have suggested what emotional state it might be. Crespi (1942), for example, has described 
contrast in animals in terms of elation when the value of a reward is greater than expected 
(positive contrast) and depression when it is worse than expected (negative contrast). And 
with the procedures described here, the emotion experienced upon encountering the more 
negative event is likely to be frustration — an emotion proposed by Amsel (1958). The 
contrast account does imply, however, that this form of contrast need not depend on the 
social construct of the need for consistency between one’s beliefs or on the implied social 
mechanism, the avoidance of hypocrisy. That is, the need to be consistent may be a human 
construct that overlays the underlying contrast and serves to motivate and then rationalize 
the resolution of the dissonance caused by the inconsistency. 
 The contrast account may also have implications for rational decision-making. 
Justification of effort implies the rationalization of one’s behavior. “Although I generally 
believe X, in this case I was justified in doing Y.” Contrast, however, merely implies there is a 
preferred outcome or bias due to what came before it. Because we are social animals, we may 
experience contrast and we may also feel an obligation to justify our behavior (to ourselves 
as well as to others). However, the obligation to justify one’s actions may arise from the bias: 
the added value of the outcome produced by contrast. That is, contrast may provide an added 
value for all organisms but it is very likely to be only humans who need to justify it to 
themselves or to others.  
If the cognitive dissonance results from contrast, it suggests that the bias is automatic 
and justification comes after the fact. Thus, if one wants to avoid the bias, it may not be 
sufficient to avoid justifying the belief or the resulting behavior because the contrast-induced 
bias may remain. Instead, one may need to recognize its automatic nature. If one wants to 
make a rational choice, one should attempt to discount the contrast produced by the prior 
effort. For example, if one is interested in joining a group, although the cost of initiation may 
be a factor in making that choice, one should try to avoid including that cost again in deciding 
on the value of the group. 
It should also be noted that although contrast may provide an alternative, more 
parsimonious, account of certain complex social-psychological phenomena, the presence of 
contrast implies a form of relational learning that cannot be accounted for by means of 
traditional behavioral theories and thus needs to be explained in its own right (see e.g., 
Flaherty, 1996). 
 Other forms of cognitive dissonance may arise from the choice of immediate 
reinforcement (e.g., smoking a cigarette) and the conflict resulting from the delayed 
probabilistic negative consequences of that choice (e.g., poor health). Often denial is the 
mechanism that is used to deal with the dissonance. Alternatively, however, the conflict may 
be resolved by taking measures to make it less likely to smoke and more likely to obtain the 
delayed reinforcement of better health (e.g., aversion therapy). Interestingly, similar effects 
can be found in pigeons when they choose to expend effort to avoid the impulse to respond 
too early (Schwartz & Williams, 1971). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
  
The results of the experiments with animals presented here suggest that it would be 
more parsimonious to explain the findings in terms of within-trial contrast rather than 
cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. But they also raise the possibility that similar 
contrast effects may play a role when analogous results are found in research with humans. 
Imagine, for example, the results of the classic experiment by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). 
Subjects took part in a monotonous repetitive task involving turning pegs in holes. They were 
then asked to describe the task as “interesting” to a subject in the next room and were paid 
either $1 or $20 before doing so. But before engaging in their deceitful assignment, they were 
asked to rate the peg-turning task they had just completed. Surprisingly, those subjects that 
had been paid $1 rated the task as more interesting than those subjects that had been paid 
$20. Festinger and Carlsmith interpreted their findings in terms of cognitive dissonance. 
Those who were paid $20 could justify to themselves what they were going to do because of 
the large payment, whereas those who were paid only $1 could not. For those who were paid 
only $1, the theory suggests that the only way they could justify to themselves what they had 
agreed to do was to modify their belief in the nature of the preceding monotonous task. 
 According to the model presented in Figure 2, however, the peg-turning task would 
put the subjects in a somewhat negative state, whereas the promise of payment would have 
had a positive effect on their state and the larger payment would have had a still larger 
positive effect. When the subjects were then asked to rate the peg-turning task, they would 
have viewed the task retrospectively from a higher ($20) or somewhat lower ($1) positive 
state. Relative to the higher positive state, the peg-turning task would have appeared to have 
more negative value than the lower positive state. Thus, there would have been a smaller 
judgment of task aversiveness (i.e., less contrast) following the smaller payment. 
 A similar interpretation would be applicable to a range of results including the 
justification-of-effort effect (Aronson & Mills, 1959). One could interpret the relief one feels 
at the completion of a difficult task and the reward that follows as a relatively large change in 
hedonic state from negative to positive. The more negative the state one experiences during 
the difficult task, the greater should be the relative change in state upon its completion. 
 The hypothesis that contrast may be involved in what appear to be complex social 
phenomena does not mean that social influence is not also involved. Cognitive dissonance or 
justification of effort involving discrepancies between behavior and beliefs may also 
contribute to the paradoxical behavior demonstrated. The animal research reported here 
suggests, however, that these more complex social phenomena may be based on simpler less 
cognitive processes involving mechanisms common to many species. That is, these complex 
processes may overlay the simpler contrast effects on which they are based. A goal of future 
research will be to develop procedures to distinguish between contrast and more cognitive 
accounts and to determine the degree to which belief-based theories are needed to account 
for the cognitive dissonance effects found. 
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